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Abstract: Donald Trump’s speeches 
and messages are characterized by 
terms that are commonly referred to as 
“thick” or “emotive”, meaning that 
they are characterized by a tendency to 
be used to generate emotive reactions. 
This paper investigates how emotive 
meaning is related to emotions, and 
how it is generated or manipulated. 
Emotive meaning is analyzed as an 
evaluative conclusion that results from 
inferences triggered by the use of a 
term, which can be represented and as-
sessed using argumentation schemes. 
The evaluative inferences are regarded 
as part of the connotation of emotive 
words, which can be modified and sta-
bilized by means of recontextualiza-
tions. The manipulative risks underly-
ing the misuse and the redefinition of 
emotive words are accounted for in 
terms of presuppositions and implicit 
modifications of the interlocutors’ 
commitments. 
Résumé: Les discours et les messages 
de Trump sont caractérisés par des 
termes couramment appelés «affectif» 
et par une tendance à être utilisés pour 
générer des réactions affectives. Cet ar-
ticle étudie comment la signification 
affective est liée aux émotions et com-
ment elle est produite ou manipulée. La 
signification affective est analysée 
comme une conclusion évaluative ré-
sultant d'inférences déclenchées par 
l'utilisation d'un terme, qui peut être 
représenté et évalué à l'aide de schémas 
d'argumentation. Les inférences évalu-
atives sont considérées comme faisant 
partie de la connotation des mots affec-
tifs, qui peuvent être modifiés et stabi-
lisés au moyen de recontextualisations. 
Les risques manipulatoires sous-ja-
cents à l’utilisation incorrecte et à la re-
définition des mots affectifs sont 
comptabilisés en termes de présupposi-
tions et de modifications implicites des 
engagements des interlocuteurs
Keywords: emotive language, slurs, pragmatics, argumentation schemes, conno-
tation, rhetoric 
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1. Introduction 
The 2016 Presidential elections can be considered as unique. By re-
jecting the “politically correct” image of a presidential candidate, 
Trump adopted a type of rhetoric characterized by the frequent use 
of what has been reported by the press as “charged expressions” or 
“loaded language” (see, for instance, Stokols 2016; Wildermuth 
2016; Gregoire 2016), which in the philosophical literature have 
been commonly referred to as “ethical” or emotive words (Stevenson 
1937; Stevenson 1944). Words such as “losers” (Neuman 2015), 
“bimbo” (Gambino 2015), “stupid”, “scum”, “fools” are only the 
most stereotypical examples of terms that are not simply used to de-
scribe reality by modifying the cognitive response of the interlocutor 
(i.e., “informing” him), but more importantly to affect the interlocu-
tor’s attitudes towards a state of affairs and suggest a course of ac-
tion. Ethical or emotive words are a powerful rhetorical instrument 
used for “framing” an issue (Druckman 2002; Entman 1993) and in-
fluencing the interlocutors’ decisions. However, their nature and 
their effects constitute, also, crucial philosophical problems, involv-
ing philosophical positions, such as nominalism, contextualism, ex-
ternalism, or inferentialism (Hom 2010), some of which have been 
debated over centuries. Such issues are recently attracting increasing 
attention from both a philosophical and linguistic perspective, even 
though most of the studies have focused on a specific type of emotive 
words, slurs (Croom 2011; Croom 2014; Blakemore 2015; Hom 
2008; Hom 2010).  
The importance and complexity of emotive words can be summa-
rized in the following account given by Arnauld and Nicole in their 
Logic:  
[…] people often do not consider the entire meaning of words. That 
is, words often signify more than they appear to, and when people 
try to explain their meaning, they do not represent the entire impres-
sion made in the mind. This is so because for an uttered or written 
sound to signify is nothing other than to prompt an idea connected 
to this sound in the mind by striking our ears or eyes. Now, fre-
quently, in addition to the main idea which is considered its proper 
meaning, a word may prompt several other ideas—which may be 
called incidental ideas—without our realizing it, although the mind 
receives their impressions. For example, if we say to someone, “You 
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lied about it,” and we consider only the principal meaning of this 
expression, this is the same as saying: “You know that the contrary 
of what you say is true.” But in common use these words carry an 
additional idea of contempt and outrage. They make us think that the 
person who says them does not care whether they injure us, and this 
makes the words insulting and offensive. (1996, chap. I, 14) 
These reflections point to a controversial problem in pragmatics and 
philosophy, namely, the relationship between an utterance and its 
lexical components. While the speaker’s communicative intention 
can be inferred only in the context of a conversation, it depends on 
the sentence meaning (Levinson 1983, pp. 16-19). Pejoratives, and 
more generally, emotive words shortcut the complex inferential re-
lation between decoding and inferencing: they express the speaker’s 
psychological attitudes towards the state of affairs referred to, and 
this effect is relatively stable in different contexts (Bianchi 2018; 
Hom 2010).  
While pragmatic and philosophical theories have focused on the 
theoretical problem of explaining the nature of such effects, the rep-
resentation of the emotive meaning, its relationship to emotions, and 
the possibility of modifying it have been almost neglected. This pa-
per intends to account for the effects of emotive words in terms of 
inferences that can be represented as micro-arguments. Through 
some examples drawn from Trump’s speeches and messages, this 
approach will be shown to objectify the vague notion of “emotive 
meaning” and allow the assessment of the use of such words, ex-
plaining the strategies and mechanisms used for crafting and trigger-
ing the “incidental ideas” and the associated emotive effects.   
2. Using loaded words   
The notion of “incidental ideas” clearly explains what has been re-
ferred to in the philosophical literature as “derogatory content” or 
“properties” (Hom 2010; Hom 2008) or “emotive meaning” (Steven-
son 1937). The latter term, in particular, captures the essential con-
nection between the properties of some terms (such as “peace”, “de-
mocracy”, or “terrorism”) and emotions, or rather action-oriented, 
immediate responses. As Stevenson (1937, pp. 18-19) put it, “instead 
of merely describing people’s interests, they change and intensify 
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them. They recommend an interest in an object, rather than state that 
the interest already exists.” Such terms have the tendency to lead the 
hearer towards a decision by affecting his or her system of interests 
(Stevenson 1944; Stevenson 1938a; Stevenson 1938b) because they 
can be used to elicit emotive reactions (Stevenson 1944, p. 54). This 
dimension of a word tendency, which is frequently dependent on the 
evaluation of the denoted state of affairs (for example, in cases such 
as “peace”), but can be independent from it (such as in “cur” vs. 
“dog”)1, was called “emotive meaning”. Words characterized by an 
emotive meaning can be used for persuading the interlocutor or the 
audience to carry out a specific action. More specifically, such terms 
(called “ethical”—or commonly referred to as emotive words) are 
characterized by the “wedding” between their descriptive and emo-
tive meaning (Stevenson 1944, pp. 206, 210), as they at the same 
time describe a state of affairs and direct the interlocutor’s interests 
towards their referent. For this reason, the speaker can manipulate or 
redirect the interlocutor’s attitude (i.e., evaluation or interests) to-
wards a state of affairs (in cognitive approaches to emotions, a “tar-
get”, see De Sousa 1987, p. 20)  by redefining the “descriptive mean-
ing” or the “emotive meaning” of the ethical word used to refer to it 
(Stevenson 1938a, p. 332). In the first case, the ethical term is “per-
suasively defined”, in the second case, “quasi-defined”. The Trump 
campaign offers clear and philosophically relevant examples of these 
tactics, starting from the basic one consisting in the use of “emotive 
words”. 
2.1.  Using emotive words to craft emotions 
The most prototypical example of use of emotive words to steer the 
audience’s emotions and evaluation of a state of affairs consists in 
the use of slurs. For example, we consider the following excerpt from 
Trump’s campaign rally in Hilton Head Island, South Carolina (Fed-
eral News Service 2016), in which he describes journalists:    
 
1 This distinction is a distinction between “emotive meaning”, which is the poten-
tiality of a word, and the cause thereof, which can be usually found in the values 
associated with the denotation (the “ethical” dimension), but not necessarily.  
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Case 1: Scum and other slurs 
They’re scum. They’re horrible people. They are so illegitimate. … 
Some of the people in the press are honorable. But you’ve got 50% 
who are terrible people. […] 
I would never kill them, but I do hate them. And some of them are 
such lying, disgusting people. It’s true. (Hampson 2016) 
In particular, “scum” is a lexicalized metaphor, a slur whose defini-
tion includes an evaluation of the subject matter (very bad or im-
moral person) (Hom 2008). Other adjectives (“horrible”, “terrible”, 
“disgusting”) are purely evaluative, namely provide an assessment 
of the name modified, which is described referring to the emotion 
that is encouraged (fear, unpleasantness, disgust). Finally, words 
such as “illegitimate” or “lying” can be considered as properly ethi-
cal words. They refer to a state of affairs commonly evaluated neg-
atively, which thus has the “potentiality” of triggering—in certain 
contexts of use—a specific emotion (such as contempt). The evalu-
ative component is not part of their definition but culturally associ-
ated with the referent.  
In the example above, notice that the emotive meaning can be as-
sociated with a term in different fashions. Apart from slurs, some of 
which at least carry an evaluative component in their definition, and 
evaluative adjectives, Trump uses metaphors and “ethical” words. 
Metaphors, in particular, carry with them the common ground com-
monly associated with the vehicle (Kovecses 2015, pp. 179-180; 
Clark 1996; Ritchie 2006, pp. 88-96), namely, the frame or the script 
(Samet and Schank 1984) that is activated, or the context in which it 
has been previously or prototypically used (Ritchie 2006, pp. 190-
191; Kovecses 2015, pp. 180-181; Clark 1996, pp. 38-41). In this 
sense, such previous contexts make specific, accidental (evaluative) 
properties or inferences salient, i.e., accessible because of their con-
ventionality, frequency, familiarity, or prototypicality (Giora 2008; 
Giora 2003, p. 147). For this reason, a metaphor can lead to associ-
ations and inferences that can trigger emotions, as pointed out in the 
Logic of Port Royal: 
For in addition to their principal meaning, metaphors signify the 
speaker’s emotion and passion, and thus imprint both ideas in the 
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mind, whereas plain expressions indicate only the unvarnished truth. 
(Arnauld and Nicole 1996, chap. I, 13) 
A clear example of the use of metaphors for arousing emotions can 
be found in the aforementioned speech given by Trump in South 
Carolina:  
Case 2: Behemoth  
I order thousands of televisions, they’re all from South Korea. So 
we have 28,000 people on the border separating South Korea from 
this maniac in North Korea, we get nothing. What do — we get noth-
ing. They’re making a fortune. It’s an economic behemoth. […]  
A lot of you don’t know we protect Germany. Germany! Mercedes 
Benz, how many people have a Mercedes Benz? We protect Ger-
many. It’s an economic behemoth. (Federal News Service 2016) 
Here, “behemoth” is used not only for referring to Germany or South 
Korea using the image of the biblical mighty beast. More im-
portantly, the common ground associated with the vehicle due to the 
previous narrations (monster provoking chaos; monster destroying 
and eating the world) leads to negative assessments of the targets, 
leading to immediate emotional responses (danger, ergo fear).  
A similar strategy is used for eliciting the emotive response of 
anger (Ben-Ze’ev 2000, p. 380) by depicting a state of affairs as an 
undeserved offence. Trump describes the United States as a “dump-
ing ground” in which the world is depositing their garbage, i.e., the 
migrants:   
 Case 3: Dumping ground 
And we’re like a dumping ground for the world. We’re a dumping 
ground. They want to take these migrants — the migrants, you 
know, and I feel terrible about the migration, caused by Hillary Clin-
ton and Barack Obama. They’re the ones that caused it. They go into 
Libya. They knocked the hell out of Gadhafi. OK, so Gadhafi — 
they backed rebels who end up killing the ambassador and the other 
young people. (Federal News Service 2016) 
In addition to implicitly labelling the migrants as “garbage”, provok-
ing the evaluation of inferiority which is the basis of contempt (Ben-
Ze’ev 2000, p. 390), Trump presents the problem of migration as an 
offence of littering the property of the Americans. These emotive 
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words are then connected with the offenders (Obama and Clinton) 
who can thus become the objects of anger.  
In addition to metaphors, similes can trigger similar emotive ef-
fects. In the following case, Trump emotionally describes his Repub-
lican competitor, Marco Rubio, as “weak like a baby”. The word 
“baby” has no negative emotive meaning; however, Trump uses it to 
reinforce the evaluation of the opponent as weak, relying on the con-
cept of helplessness usually associated with a baby. This simile, 
however, presents Rubio as a helpless baby, which is in striking con-
trast with the position he is aiming at, resulting in contempt and rid-
icule:  
Case 4: Baby  
Nice person, weak on illegal immigration … like, weak like a baby. 
Like a baby. Not a good poker player, because every time he’s under 
pressure he just starts to profusely sweat. If he was playing poker 
with me, I’d say ‘Ah!’ The water would start pouring off his body. 
(Hartmann 2016) 
As Trump’s vocabulary shows, emotive words are an umbrella term 
covering various types of associations between “descriptive” and 
“emotive” meaning, such as slurs (involving an evaluative compo-
nent in their descriptive meaning), evaluative adjectives, ethical 
terms, and metaphors. What is common to all of such strategies is 
that the emotive meaning is prototypically associated with the word 
used, or (such as in case of “baby”) is selected and clearly indicated 
contextually among the various evaluations commonly connected 
with the vehicle.  
2.2.  Persuasive definitions 
The “wedding” between descriptive and emotive meaning of emo-
tive words leads to a dangerous possibility, namely, the use of an 
emotive word to refer to a state of affairs that is normally assessed 
neutrally or even in a way different from the emotive meaning of the 
term used. In the Port Royal Logic, this strategy was described as 
follows: 
As a result, the same thing can be expressed decently by one sound 
and indecently by another, if one of these sounds is connected to 
some other idea that conceals the shame, and if the other, by contrast, 
236  Macagno, Walton 
© Fabrizio Macagno, Douglas Walton. Informal Logic, Vol. 39, No. 3 (2019), pp. 229-261 
presents it to the mind in an immodest manner. Hence the words 
“adultery,” “incest,” and “abominable sin” are not shameful, alt-
hough they represent extremely shameful actions, because they only 
represent them as covered by a veil of horror which causes them to 
be viewed simply as crimes. These words thereby signify the crime 
of these actions more than the actions themselves. On the other hand, 
certain words express these actions without the sense of horror, as 
being somewhat pleasant rather than criminal, and even join to them 
an idea of immodesty and effrontery. These are the shameful and 
indecent words. (Arnauld and Nicole 1996, chap. I, 13) 
Here, emotive words are claimed to be used for referring to actions 
that are normally considered as offences or as shameful. The use of 
such words suggests or invites an evaluation that is different from 
the prototypical one, or that at least is not shared or commonly ac-
cepted. This possibility is rooted in the redefinition of the emotive 
word, i.e., in the strategy that Stevenson named persuasive definition 
(Stevenson 1938a; Macagno and Walton 2008; Macagno and Wal-
ton 2010). Persuasive definitions are explicit or implicit redefinitions 
of ethical words, aimed at redirecting their emotive meanings to 
states of affairs that would not be normally denoted by them. For 
example, by redefining “culture” as originality, the speaker can 
change the hearer’s “interests by changing names”, redirecting the 
interlocutor’s evaluation of their referents and his related affect (Ste-
venson 1938a, p. 332; Macagno and Walton 2014, chap. 3). In this 
sense, persuasive definitions introduce ambiguity, as the speaker 
uses a term with a new meaning, while the hearer interprets the ut-
terance in which it is used relying on its ordinary or presumptive 
meaning—and considering its presumptive preconditions and/or the 
prototypical contexts in which it normally occurs.  
Trump uses this strategy very clearly in his aforementioned Hil-
ton Head Island speech, where he uses the term “genius”, a term nor-
mally associated with a very positive evaluation of the referent:    
Case 5: Genius 
No, no, no. They’re fed up. They’re fed up with the media. I mean, 
I’ve got—and you know, not all bad, but there’s so much dishonesty 
in the media. And I like to call it out. And one of the things that’s 
really been amazing to me, and such—it’s been so beautiful to 
watch—the level of genius in the public. They get it, you know? 
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They really get it. They want to marginalize us, they want to do all 
of this and they want to make everybody look like, “Oh, gee.” The 
level of genius—they fully understand. They know they’re crooked, 
they know they’re dishonest and they really—otherwise, who gets 
worse publicity than me? (Federal News Service 2016) 
Trump uses “genius”, which by definition means “very great and 
rare natural ability or skill, especially in a particular area such as 
science or art”, to refer to a very ordinary capacity, namely under-
standing an alleged discrepancy between real and reported facts. 
This tactic is used for other terms, such as “incredible” (“the incred-
ible men and women of the United States military”), which are used 
for transferring the positive judgment—and the related emotion of 
admiration—from individuals and events “too extraordinary and im-
probable to be believed” to average people and actions. The ambi-
guity generated can also alter the presuppositions shared by the pub-
lic, who can be led into accepting common capacities and workers 
as exceptional (Kecskes and Zhang 2013).  
2.3.  Redefining emotive meaning 
A different strategy described by Stevenson is the quasi-definition, 
through which the speaker can modify the emotive meaning com-
monly associated with an expression. Through the repeated use of a 
term in a context that associates it with a positive or negative con-
clusion (Jeshion 2013), it is possible to introduce or modify its dis-
position to elicit a specific emotional response. A clear example is 
the modification and stabilization of the emotive meaning of “polit-
ically correct” in Trump’s campaign.  
“Politically correct” is not commonly perceived as necessarily de-
rogatory (Bump 2015). However, in his campaign, Trump used this 
expression in contexts that were all characterized by a negative atti-
tude towards its referent, which was justified based on specific sug-
gested inferences. Political correctness was identified by Trump as a 
problem during the first Republican debate in August in the follow-
ing reply to the attack by the moderator concerning some offensive 
comments about women that Trump had made:   
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Case 6: Politically correct 
I think the big problem this country has is being politically correct 
[…] I’ve been challenged by so many people, and I don’t frankly 
have time for total political correctness. And to be honest with you, 
this country doesn’t have time either. This country is in big trouble. 
We don’t win anymore. We lose to China. We lose to Mexico both 
in trade and at the border. We lose to everybody. (Tumulty and John-
son 2016) 
In this context, “to be politically correct” is characterized as a prob-
lem and contrasted with serious occupations (“I don’t have time”) 
and more importantly with addressing national interests and solving 
big troubles (“this country doesn’t have time either”). Trump quasi-
defines this expression as a non-serious waste of time, a distraction 
from facing real problems, which characterises a group to which he, 
the non-politically correct one, does not belong at all. In other con-
texts, both in public speeches and on Twitter (@realDonaldTrump 
2015), “politically correct” was associated with the similar concepts 
(incidental ideas according to the Logic of Port Royal) of hypocrisy, 
foolishness, time-wasting, and cowardice.  
3. The rationality of emotive meaning 
As Stevenson pointed out, by using words that have (or have been 
given) the tendency to elicit an emotive response, it is possible to 
redirect “interests” or rather the evaluations of a state of affairs and 
the related decisions or judgments. This passage from the use of a 
word to the disposition to act in a specific fashion can be represented 
theoretically as a chain of inferential steps, allowing a critical eval-
uation of the reasonableness of a choice or a judgment. However, the 
abstract argumentative model cannot account for the effectiveness of 
emotive words. In order to investigate this dimension, we need to 
inquire into the heuristic reasoning steps that characterize the “emo-
tive” dimension of the “loaded” or ethical words.  
3.1.  The rationality of emotive words 
The “descriptive” and “emotive” meaning of ethical (or loaded, or 
emotive) words, i.e., the tendency to elicit cognitive or emotive 
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responses, can be interpreted from a logical2 perspective as different 
types of inferences. The descriptive meaning can be regarded as an 
inference or a set of inferences attributing a predicate to an entity (a 
subject) based on specific characteristics and definitional premises 
(the process of “naming” reality). The emotive meaning can be in-
terpreted as an inference (or as set of inferences) leading from a de-
scription of a state of affairs to a value judgment thereon (evalua-
tion), and in some cases the proposal of a commitment to a course of 
action (decision-making inferences).  
The descriptive meaning can be represented as an inferential pas-
sage (described as argumentative loci or topoi in the dialectical tra-
dition) aimed at classifying a state of affairs. This inference is 
grounded on classificatory premises, which can be very different in 
kind. A classification (the attribution of a property to a subject/entity 
based on some properties characterizing it) can be grounded on def-
initions, descriptions, or stereotypes. Depending on the nature of the 
“definitional” premise, the acceptability and defeasibility of the con-
clusion vary. This inference can be represented using the following 
scheme (Walton, Reed and Macagno 2008, p. 319):  
 
Argumentation scheme 1: Argument from classification 
 
Premise 1 
If some particular thing a can be classified as 
falling under verbal category C, then a has 
property P (in virtue of such a classification). 
Premise 2 
a can be classified as falling under verbal cat-
egory C. 
Conclusion a has property P. 
 
The reasonable and correct application of this scheme can be as-
sessed dialogically by taking into account its defeasibility condi-
tions, represented by the following critical questions:  
 
 
2 The term “logical” shall be considered as referring to the natural language logic 
investigated in the dialectical tradition and in argumentation theory.  
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CQ1: What evidence is there that a has property C, as opposed to 
evidence indicating room for doubt about whether it should be so 
classified? 
CQ2: Is the classification premise the definition of P? Or is it merely 
a description thereof? Or is it a stereotype reporting only on a shared 
and unproven relationship between the two properties?  
 
This scheme underlies both the use of an emotive word and the pos-
sible inferences that can be drawn from it (Macagno and Walton 
2014, chap. 3). For example, the claim that “Clinton (or another op-
ponent) is politically correct” can be acceptable because of a reason 
linking “politically correct” to a specific behavior of Clinton, such 
as refraining from attacking minorities or religious groups, namely, 
“avoiding language and practices which could offend political sen-
sibilities”. The link between her behavior and her classification is 
based on the definition of “politically correct”, which can be hardly 
challenged. However, if this classification were based on the premise 
that “politically correct people are those who do not speak their mind 
(or are not concerned with real problems)” (namely, a mere descrip-
tion and not a definition), it would be much more defeasible. This 
type of reasoning can be used, also, for drawing further properties 
from a classification. For example, from the definitional premise it 
is possible to conclude that “Clinton does not want to offend peo-
ple”; from the second descriptive premise, it is possible to infer that 
“Clinton does not speak her mind (or is not concerned with real prob-
lems).”   
The classification scheme is one of the grounds of evaluative in-
ferences, namely reasoning steps leading to a specific type of predi-
cation, consisting in the attribution of an evaluative predicate (the 
species of good and evil, Aristotle Topics, 123b9) based on specific 
topics:  
First, then, that which is more lasting or secure is more desirable 
than that which is less so; and so is that which is more likely to be 
chosen by the prudent or by the good man or by the right law, or by 
men who are good in any particular line, when they make their 
choice as such; i.e. either whatever most of them or what all of them 
would choose; e.g. in medicine (or in carpentry) those things are 
more desirable which most, or all, doctors would choose; or, in 
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general, whatever most men or all men or all things would choose, 
e.g. the good; for everything aims at the good. (Aristotle Topics, 
116a13-116a21)  
These types of evaluative premises are culture-dependent reasons for 
classifying something as desirable or not (Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca 1951), and—just like other types of classifications—can be 
grounded on the definitions of evaluative predicates (what is good, 
desirable, dangerous, etc. see Vendler 1963; von Wright 1963) or 
stereotypes, and thus be more or less defeasible. For example, “po-
litically correct” can be judged as desirable and good, as it is the 
privation of something evil, offending (provoking pain). Otherwise, 
it can be considered as evil, as politically correct people are hypo-
crites, and hypocrisy is falsity—an evil thing.   
The difference between the descriptive and the emotive meaning 
of ethical (emotive) words thus consists in the different premises 
used for drawing further inferences from a classification of a state of 
affairs or an entity. Moreover, in both cases the conclusions (descrip-
tive or evaluative judgments) may be grounded on more or less de-
feasible premises, depending on whether they are definitional (se-
mantic) or mere stereotypes.  
3.2.  The dynamic uses of emotive words 
Value judgments can be the premises of further action-oriented in-
ferences, which can account for the “dynamic uses” of emotive 
words, namely, “inciting people to action” or venting emotions (Ste-
venson 1937, pp. 21-22). In both cases, the dynamic uses are aimed 
at altering people’s attitude (affection), either by encouraging the 
hearer to commit himself to a course of action or behavior, or arous-
ing sympathy (Ben-Ze’ev 2000, chap. 11). In particular, the action-
oriented effect can be represented in terms of inferences, which can 
lead to a commitment (an attitude of the individual towards a judg-
ment or a state of affairs, see Hamblin 1970; Walton and Krabbe 
1995) or in more complex patterns, leading to further inferences.    
The passage from a value judgment to a specific commitment can 
be represented as follows (Walton, Reed and Macagno 2008, p. 321) 
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Argumentation scheme 2: Argument from Values 
 
Premise 1 
The state of affairs x is positive/negative as 
judged by Agent A according to Value V 
(value judgment). 
Premise 2 
The fact that x is positive/negative affects the 
interpretation and therefore the evaluation of 
goal G of Agent A (If x is good, it supports 
commitment to G). 
Conclusion 
The evaluation of x according to Value V is a 
reason for retaining/retracting commitment to 
G. 
 
The object of the commitment is generically represented as a goal, 
which includes both a generic end towards which an action can be 
directed (approval or disapproval) or a specific one (supporting a 
candidate or voting against him). For example, the use of the term 
“politically correct” for describing Clinton’s behavior can be nor-
mally considered as a reason for approving of her, or at least of her 
behavior. However, when Trump quasi-defined it, this phrase be-
came an instrument for disapproving of her (and the Obama admin-
istration’s) conduct, as hypocrisy (or frivolousness) that should be 
normally avoided, not trusted, or be disapproved of. The implicitness 
of the quasi-defined emotive meaning, however, leaves the conclu-
sion of the inference vague, pointing at a generic zone of affect (pos-
itive or negative) rather than a specific emotion (Caffi and Janney 
1994, pp. 327-328).   
This generic commitment can become more specific by drawing 
the possible actions that can be used to pursue the goal of the agent. 
Practical reasoning and reasoning from consequences (von Wright 
1963b; Macagno and Walton 2018) can be represented as schemes 
of inference connecting a desired situation—or rather a “declaration 
of intention”, a commitment to bringing about a state of affairs—
with conditions. In the first case, the agent can reason by selecting 
(committing to) the productive or necessary means for bringing 
about the desired state of affairs (the best way of disapproving of 
Clinton is not to vote for her). In the other type of reasoning, called 
argument from consequences, the agent only considers one 
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relationship between a desirable or undesirable state of affairs and 
the action that is the necessary or productive cause thereof. This in-
ference can be represented as follows (Walton, Reed and Macagno 
2008, pp. 332-333): 
 
Argumentation scheme 3: Argument from consequences  
 
Premise 1 
If action Q is brought about, good (bad) con-
sequences will plausibly occur. 
Premise 2 
Good (bad) consequences are (not) desirable 
(should (not) occur). 
Conclusion Therefore, Q should (not) be brought about. 
 
 For example, this type of reasoning underlies the passage from the 
negative evaluation of a “politically correct” candidate or her possi-
ble future actions (a politically correct president is not desirable; the 
politically correct behavior of a president is not desirable) to a spe-
cific action (I should not vote for her).  
This type of analysis can represent the possible inferences that 
emotive words trigger. However, it does not take into account the 
other dimension of emotive meaning, namely, the impact of a (po-
tential) emotive reaction to the use of emotive words in emotive ut-
terances. This effect can explain the rhetorical effectiveness of such 
words, accounting for a faster, heuristic, and not critically assessed 
connection between a classification and a commitment.  
4. The fast rationality of emotive words 
One of the first accounts of the relationship between emotions, value 
judgments, and heuristic reasoning can be found in the aforemen-
tioned Logic of Port Royal. The authors noted that the connection 
between some “ideas” and their evaluation is automatic and is 
grounded on past emotional responses: 
The first and main inclination of lust is towards the sensual pleasure 
that arises from certain external objects. Aware that the pleasure it 
adores is derived from these things, the soul immediately connects 
them with the idea of good, and whatever deprives it of pleasure with 
the idea of evil. Next, seeing that riches and human power are the 
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usual means for mastering these objects of human lust, the soul be-
gins to regard them as a great good. Now since there is a certain 
excellence in happiness, the soul never separates these two ideas, 
always regarding everyone it considers happy as great, and those it 
considers poor and unhappy as lowly. (Arnauld and Nicole 1996, 
chap. I, 9) 
This passage summarizes the logic of emotions, or more precisely, 
the heuristic mechanisms underlying the uses of emotive words. The 
starting point is the conceptual dimension of emotions developed in 
the cognitive theories of emotions (Elster 1999, chap. 4; Pugmire 
1998; de Sousa 1987; Ben-Ze’ev 2000). On this view, emotions pre-
suppose specific subjective evaluative judgments (Solomon 2003): 
to feel an emotion corresponds to implicitly appraising a situation. 
The evaluative judgment (determining “whether an event is good or 
bad and whether people’s current actions and environment corre-
spond to their personal goals and expectations” (Keltner and Lerner 
2010, p. 315)) is connected with cognition (Lerner et al. 2015) and 
can be modified by means of arguments (Elster 1999, p. 56). The 
appraisal of a state of affairs provides a reason for a physical and 
psychical reaction that can drive us to action (Frijda and Mesquita 
2000, p. 46), or rather a tendency to perform a type of action (fleeing, 
reducing uncertainty, etc.).  
The appraisal aspect of emotions is strictly culturally dependent, 
as the values (including morals, ethical norms, aesthetic criteria, etc.) 
are not only the result of personal past experiences (Damasio 1994, 
p. 246), but more importantly of culture, which embodies a commu-
nity’s experiences (Smith and Lazarus 1990, p. 627; Frijda and 
Mesquita 1998; Frijda and Mesquita 2000; Solomon 2003, p. 87). 
Since emotions involve value judgments, and value judgments can 
be triggered, suggested, or advanced by the use of emotive words, 
emotions can be crafted rhetorically. This relationship between 
words and emotions, which is the ground of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, is 
twofold. Emotive words can suggest, or rather heuristically trigger, 
a value judgment, a presupposition of emotions; in turn, emotions 
have an epistemic effect, altering our perception of the described 
events. Emotive words can evoke or depict scenarios that we can 
imagine and confront with our memories (Frijda 1988; Elster 1999), 
and at the same time can make us experience a specific emotion. In 
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this fashion, the description becomes a “vivid illustration” 
(Quintilianus Institutio Oratoria, VIII, 3, 61) that we can perceive as 
real through our senses (Frijda and Mesquita 2000, p. 69; Clore and 
Gasper 2000, p. 26). The use of emotive words thus can arouse arti-
ficial emotions and instill beliefs.     
Emotive words can trigger emotional responses, which are, from 
a reasoning point of view, shortcuts of the more complex inferential 
and critical mechanism described in the previous section. Emotional 
judgments are hasty and biased, leading to automatic conclusions of 
right and wrong (Damasio 1994; Greene and Haidt 2002; Keltner 
and Lerner 2010, p. 331), which in turn are at the basis of a sudden 
action tendency (depending on the intensity of the emotion), auto-
matic, time-tested responses, requiring low processing efforts 
(Loewenstein and Lerner 2003, p. 628). Emotive words thus provide 
or suggest an evaluation that activates a pattern of automatic (heu-
ristic) reasoning (Chen and Chaiken 1999; Kahneman 2003; Petty 
and Cacioppo 1986), which has devastating effects on the critical 
(systematic) assessment of the described or referred-to state of af-
fairs (Loewenstein and Lerner 2003; Blanchette and Richards 2004).  
On this perspective, the use of ethical words such as “liars”, 
“dumping ground”, “bimbo”, or “behemoth” mirror the interlocu-
tor’s previous experiences creating a relationship between them and 
the case at issue that can trigger an immediate emotive response or a 
decision. These negative associations, resulting from memories or 
previous contexts evoking emotional reactions (Doerksen and 
Shimamura 2001), provide the hearer with a shortcut to a conclusion 
that inhibits the systematic assessment of the variables and critical 
aspects involved in the inferential steps mentioned above. A liar is 
not only a person not telling the truth; he or she is a contemptible 
individual. A dumping ground is not a metaphor for a place hosting 
allegedly unwanted people; it a place that has become shameful be-
cause of others. Emotive words suggest emotions by means of asso-
ciations and memories, and in turn emotions lead to immediate con-
clusions concerning the assessment of a state of affairs and the re-
lated agent’s commitments. The hearer is led to feeling emotions 
such as contempt for journalists and anger against those who turned 
America into a shameful place, which influence his possible inten-
tions to act. 
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5.  Crafting heuristics: Connotation and emotive meaning 
In Sections 1 and 2 above, we noticed how emotive words can be 
used for eliciting an “affective” (using Stevenson’s terminology) or, 
rather, emotional, response, and how the “tendency” to be used for 
this purpose that characterizes such words can be modified. In par-
ticular, we pointed out how Trump in his speeches alters the “emo-
tive meaning” of the otherwise neutral or positively evaluated con-
cept of “politically correct”. However, he changes the prototypical 
context in which it is used, thus associating the phrase with different 
and negative “incidental ideas”, such as hypocrisy, falsity, or weak-
ness. Trump focuses his strategy on the commonly shared connec-
tion between “politically correct” and what in Port Royal Logic was 
called “incidental ideas”:  
But sometimes these incidental ideas are connected to the words 
themselves, because they are normally prompted by everyone who 
utters them. This is why, among expressions that appear to mean the 
same thing, some are insulting and others are polite, some are mod-
est and others immodest, some decent and others indecent. Because 
in addition to the principal idea which they share, people have con-
nected them to other ideas which cause this diversity. (Arnauld and 
Nicole 1996, chaps. I, 14) 
This excerpt points out two important aspects of emotive words. 
First, Arnauld and Nicole distinguished between two dimensions of 
the “comprehension” of a term, i.e., the “traits that define its con-
tent”: the denotation (namely, the definitional features used for clas-
sification or referential purposes) and the connotation (namely, the 
additional sematic features) (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1977, p. 12). Sec-
ond, they pointed out how the ordinary use affects such additional 
semantic features.  
 The “emotive meaning” of ethical words can be investigated in 
terms of connotation. We can divide the broader category of “emo-
tive words” in two categories: terms (such as some slurs, such as 
“bimbo” or derogatory adjectives such as “weak” or “stupid”) that 
include in their definition an evaluative component, and terms (such 
as all the words that Stevenson analyzes under the proper label of 
“ethical” terms, representing the majority of our examples) whose 
evaluative component is only an accessory and not a definitional 
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feature. In this latter case, this connotative meaning can be consid-
ered as resulting from the uses of the term, acquiring an additional 
meaning triggered not directly by its relationship with its definitional 
features (and the referent), but as a sign used within a linguistic sys-
tem or a context. Connotation can be represented as a distinct, but 
not independent, level of meaning of a sign, using the terminology 
of Hjelmslev (1969; Molino 1971; Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1977):  
 
Expression (sign) Content
Expression Content
Level of 
Connotation
Level of 
Denotation  
 
Figure 1: Representing connotation 
As Kerbrat-Orecchioni pointed out, the sources of the connotative 
meaning can be different. She distinguishes five categories of 
connotations, including: “utterance” connotations; stylistic connota-
tions; phonetic, rhythmic, syntactic connotations; associated values; 
implicit/semantic values (information on the referent)  (Kerbrat-
Orecchioni 1977, p. 167). In particular, utterance connotations 
(“connotations énonciatives”) include the semantic features that 
characterize emotive meaning, namely ideological, axiological 
(value judgment) and emotive connotations, which can convey value 
judgments that can trigger emotional responses (Cato et al. 2004).  
These non-definitional features can be the result of the use of a term 
in a specific utterance to pursue a specific purpose, such as the afore-
mentioned use of the phrase “politically correct” by Trump (Case 6). 
However, this speech meaning can become integrated at a cultural 
level (Garza-Cuarón 1991, pp. 213-214). The context can become 
culturally associated with the use of a specific term, which acquires 
a more stable connotative meaning (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1977, p. 
119). In a sense, the lexical items thus “encapsulate” prior contexts 
of experience: “they carry context (prior context), encoding the his-
tory of their prior use (prior context) in a speech community” 
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(Kecskes 2013; Kecskes 2008; Kecskes and Zhang 2009). As 
Kecskes put it (2013, p. 133):  
Lexical items encode the history of their use, which basically creates 
a record of prior contexts. They trigger frames and cultural models 
that the interlocutor has experienced before. […] Linguistic units 
encapsulate the history of their use, i.e., the situations in which they 
have been used (Kecskes 2008). What happens in communication is 
that prior context encoded in the utterances interplays with the actual 
situational context, and this interplay results in what we call “mean-
ing.”  
In particular, Kecskes points out a dimension of meaning (which in-
volves “word-specific elements” and “culture-specific conceptual 
properties”; see Cruse 1992; Kecskes 2003, pp. 40-43) distinct from 
the semantic (definitional, or better conceptual) one. We can draw a 
correspondence between the first dimension (including both lexical-
ized and cultural properties of a lexical item) and the “emotive mean-
ing”, and between the second (conceptual) dimension and the “de-
scriptive meaning”. They jointly constitute what Kecskes refers to as 
“coresense”, namely, “a summary of the most familiar, regular, typ-
ical, and (generally, but not always) frequent uses of a word [which] 
reflects the history of use of the word and is the common core infor-
mation that was called public context […], usually shared by mem-
bers of a speech community” (2013, p. 141).  
This account of the connotative or rather contextual (parole) na-
ture of emotive meaning leads to the problem of explaining the 
mechanisms underlying how it is generated and stabilized, namely 
how a context or a set of contexts can modify or introduce and fix 
culturally a connotative content. A possible explanation can be found 
in Ducrot’s notion of topos. According to Ducrot, an utterance can 
be described as a bundle of topoi, namely argumentative connections 
representing instructions such as “uttering x, the conclusion y is sup-
ported” (Ducrot 1979; Anscombre and Ducrot 1983). As a conse-
quence, the meaning of words can be described as not starting from 
a previous knowledge of reality (their “descriptive meaning”) but 
considering their discursive (argumentative) potential (Ducrot 1984; 
Ducrot 1993). Such topoi, or argumentative contexts, are considered 
by Ducrot as presuppositions; they are characterized by an illocu-
tionary act of presupposition  (Anscombre and Ducrot 1983, p. 49).  
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The theory of topoi can explain the heuristic judgments that emo-
tive words trigger. For example, we can consider some of the cases 
illustrated in Section 2, above. In Case 1, by referring to journalists 
as “liars”, Trump automatically triggers the judgment that journalists 
are despicable and should not be trusted, based on the heuristic or 
topos that “if someone is a liar, he is untrustworthy and a contempt-
ible person.” Similarly, “behemoth” (Case 2) or “dumping ground” 
(Case 3) trigger automatic negative conclusions (“South Korea and 
Germany are dangerous as they want to devour other countries”; 
“The US is being besmeared by migrants”). In Case 5, the public or 
the military are described as “geniuses” (if they accept the proposi-
tion that the media are frequently dishonest) or “incredible”, and 
since both terms semantically encode the concept of “exceptional-
ity”, they lead to the conclusion that “they should be approved of”, 
one of the crucial components of the emotion of admiration, as, if 
someone has an exceptional skill or performs exceptional actions, he 
should be respected or approved of.  
The theory of topoi and the different strategies of use and mis-
chievous use of emotive words point out the complex relationship 
between the pragmatic phenomenon of presupposition and “emotive 
meaning”. Utterances can have presuppositions that can be of differ-
ent type (Abrusán 2011; Abrusán 2010), and which can be generated 
by lexical triggers or syntactic constructions (Levinson 1983, pp. 
203-212). Emotive words can be used to manipulate presuppositions 
in two ways. Through persuasive definitions, “sortal” presupposi-
tions can be triggered: the speaker implicitly redefines a term, lead-
ing the interlocutor to considering as true some propositions that he 
or she has not accepted—or could not accept. For example, in using 
the emotive words mentioned in Case 1 or Case 5, Trump takes for 
granted that journalists have said something false, that understanding 
the alleged media inaccuracies or “dishonesty” is an exceptional ca-
pacity, etc. In contrast, the recontextualization of an emotive word 
to support a conclusion that is not commonly backed by the use of 
such a word involves the distinct pragmatic strategy of taking for 
granted a conditional (topos) that is not commonly accepted. For ex-
ample, in Case 6, Trump’s use of “politically correct” in the argu-
ment, “There is no time for political correctness, as this country is in 
big trouble” presupposes that “if someone is politically correct, then 
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he or she is wasting time and not addressing the real problems.” This 
presupposition is reinforced by another presuppositional strategy. 
When Trump claims that “The big problem this country has is being 
politically correct”, he takes for granted that “being politically cor-
rect” is a problem, and that US politicians are politically correct.     
A quasi-definition can be used for taking for granted propositions 
(including conditionals) that are not shared, introducing new com-
mitments for the interlocutors (Macagno and Walton 2017, chap. 4) 
through an act of presupposition (Macagno 2015; Macagno and 
Walton 2014; Macagno 2012). On this perspective, persuasive defi-
nitions and quasi-definitions can be regarded as two distinct tactics 
for modifying the interlocutors’ commitments without providing the 
necessary reasons.   
6. Conclusion 
The contemporary debate on slurs and emotive words developed in 
linguistics and pragmatics (Nunberg 2017; Hom 2010) has under-
scored how the emotive effects resulting from the use of pejoratives 
or more generally “emotive words” is quite stable across contexts—
characteristic that led some scholars to include such meaning into 
the encoded meaning of these terms. This paper addresses the prob-
lem of analyzing the stability of the emotive meaning of ethical terms 
and more importantly the possibility of modifying and manipulating 
it. Building on Stevenson’s theory, our proposal is to explain emo-
tive meaning as potentiality: the use of emotive words in an utterance 
triggers a set of inferences leading to a value judgment that can be 
the basis of an emotional response. The problem was to account for 
the notion of potentiality, namely, to explain it to make the vague 
concept of “emotive meaning” representable in an objective way.  
The route from the use of an emotive word to the value judgment 
necessary for the emotive response was described as a chain of clas-
sificatory and practical inferences, which can be critically evaluated 
using argumentation schemes. The emotions that may result from 
them were shown to provide inferential shortcuts through an auto-
matic route that prevents the critical assessment of the variables in-
volved in each inferential step.  
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The relative stability of emotive meaning was explained through 
the linguistic phenomenon of connotation. It has been argued that 
emotive meaning can be crafted by means of quasi-definitions, 
namely recontextualizations in which a specific term is used as a rea-
son for evaluative conclusions triggering or suggesting emotions. 
This phenomenon involves the act of taking for granted crucial and 
often unaccepted premises warranting value judgments, manipulat-
ing in this latter case the hearer’s commitments. The repeated use of 
the quasi-defined term in similar contexts reinforces the association 
between the word and the emotion or the value judgment (Kecskes 
2013, p. 135; Mey 2006).  
The advantages of this approach are both theoretical and empiri-
cal. The phenomenon of emotive meaning, which, in linguistics, is 
mostly addressed either in terms of semantic meaning or context-
dependent inferences, is explained in terms of implicit arguments. 
Emotive meaning can be thus represented and “objectified” in terms 
of premises and a conclusion that can be evaluated and discussed. 
The explanation of the stability and the stabilization of emotive 
meaning in terms of connotation accounts for the possibility of mod-
ifying it through quasi-definitions. Connotation, represented as the 
topoi more frequently associated with the use of a term, can be meas-
ured through the tools of corpus linguistics, showing the most fre-
quent contexts of use and co-occurrences of a specific term (for an 
application of this method, see Macagno, “How can metaphors com-
municate arguments?”, submitted for publication).  
This account of emotive meaning has clear limitations. First, it is 
focused on one very specific dimension of emotive communication 
(Caffi and Janney 1994), namely, the tendency of some words to be 
used for eliciting emotional reactions. This paper concerns the prob-
lem of explaining how this tendency works and how it can be devel-
oped in strategic communication. However, the relative stability of 
that type of word tendency needs to be considered within the actual 
unit of analysis, which is the emotional utterance, and the corre-
sponding theoretical framework, which is essentially pragmatic, as 
centered on the prototypical uses of a word. The second limitation 
concerns the relationship between inferences, evaluative conclu-
sions, and emotions. In this paper we have presented the inferential 
mechanism as the potential trigger of emotions; however, we have 
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stressed that the evaluative conclusion provides only one of the con-
ditions for an emotion to be aroused. While the type of conclusion 
can be predicted based on the analysis of the most frequent contexts 
of use of a word, the emotive reaction depends on factors that go 
beyond the methods at our disposal. In this sense, our analysis is 
confined to the boundaries of the aspect of emotions that can be 
somehow explained through the tools of argumentation theory and 
linguistics.         
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